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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 On December 16, 2014, Congress enacted the Consolidated and 
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (Act) to fund the federal 
government through the 2015 fiscal year and forestall an imminent 
government shutdown.1  However, the content of this legislation was not 
limited exclusively to the allocation of funds; the Act controversially 
amended several provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).2  In a section now known as the 
“Yoder provision,”3 the Act amended section 716 of Dodd-Frank, which 
originally required certain financial institutions to “push-out” certain swap 
                                                             
* Candidate for Doctor of Jurisprudence, The University of Tennessee College of Law, 
Concentration in Business Transactions, May 2016; Research Editor, Tennessee Law 
Review, Executive Editor, Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law; 
Executive Editor, Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy; B.A. Political Science, Rhodes 
College. http://ssrn.com/author=2393377; https://www.linkedin.com/pub/william-
lay/77/1b0/263. 
1 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat. 2130 (2014). 
2 Id. § 630 (amending the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). 
3 The language in the Act is herein referred to as the “Yoder provision,” in reference to 
Kansas Congressman Kevin Yoder, who, after initially attempting to introduce the Act’s 
amendments to Dodd-Frank in 2013, inserted the amendments into the Act. See Jennifer 
Bendery, Kevin Yoder MIA After Tucking Wall Street Bailout Into Government Spending 
Bill, THE HUFFINGTON POST  (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/ 
15/kevin-yoder-wall-street-bailout_n_6329784.html. 
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transactions to outside institutions that were not covered by federal 
insurance or surety programs.4  
 This Article discusses the implementation and impact of the Yoder 
provision on derivative finance and analyzes whether the provision creates 
an excessive fiscal liability for taxpayers.  Part II of this Article discusses 
the initial implementation of Dodd-Frank’s swaps “push-out” provision and 
analyze its importance in preventing government subsidization of losses 
that ensue from private financial transactions.  Part III further examines the 
Act, specifically the Yoder provision, and explains the application of the 
Act’s amendments to section 716 of Dodd-Frank.  Part IV argues that the 
Act’s amendments to Dodd-Frank expose American taxpayers to significant 
financial liability by allowing covered depository institutions (CDIs) to 
participate in a larger variety of swaps transactions.  
 
II.  DODD-FRANK’S SWAPS “PUSH-OUT” PROVISION 
 
On July 21, 2010, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in an effort to 
“promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system. . . .”5  Dodd-Frank 
was also designed to end stimulus-era taxpayer bailouts of financial 
institutions by prohibiting the federal government from “bailing out,” 
insuring, or otherwise subsidizing losses to financial institutions that arise 
from risky financial transactions, such as swaps.6  A swap can be generally 
                                                             
4 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, 128 Stat at 2378 (section 
716 of the Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2010) was amended to add a provision to 
subsection (d) of the swaps “push out” rule); 15 U.S.C § 8305(d)(1)(C) (2010) (allowing 
covered financial institutions to engage in a broader scope of swaps activities by 
narrowing the types of swaps that are required to be pushed out); see American Bankers 
Association, Swaps Push-Out Provision, ABA BACKGROUNDER 1, (2014) (“The 
amendment to the Swaps Push-Out Rule does not repeal Section 716; it narrows the 
scope of products that are required to be “pushed-out” of an FDIC-insured bank to 
certain swaps related to structured finance.”); Peter Eavis, Wall Street Embraces a Rule 
It Hates, N.Y TIMES (May 2, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/wall-
streets-quiet-turnabout-on-swaps/ (“Dodd-Frank’s swaps push-out rule seeks to reduce 
those effective government subsidies on Wall Street trading. It requires certain types of 
derivatives to be pushed out of insured banks into another part of the bank that does not 
benefit from federal backing.”). 
5 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2010)). Dodd Frank was enacted 
primarily in response to the financial crises of 2008, colloquially termed the “Great 
Recession,” which many argue was caused predominantly by the failure of complicated 
financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities. See David Line Batty, Dodd-
Frank's Requirement of "Skin in the Game" for Asset-Backed Securities May Scalp 
Corporate Loan Liquidity, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 13, 44 (2011) (stating that asset-
backed securities were arguably the “prime culprit” in causing the recession). 
6 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, 128 Stat at 2378. Section 
712(d)(1) of Dodd-Frank required the SEC and CFTC to further define the term “swap.” 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 124 Stat. at 1644. 
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described as a transaction involving the exercise of an option, such as a put 
or call, or any type of “purchase, sale [or] payment that is dependent on the 
occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or 
contingency. . . .”7 Foreign currency swaps, debt swaps, commodity swaps 
and credit default swaps are common examples of transactions that fall 
under this definition.8 
 Section 716 of Dodd-Frank contained a provision, originally 
proposed by Senator Blanche Lincoln, titled “Prohibition Against Federal 
Government Bailouts of Swaps Entities.”9  Section 716 explicitly prohibited 
the federal government from providing “federal assistance” to any 
distressed “swaps entity with respect to any swap, security-based swap, or 
other activity of the swaps entity.”10 
Under Dodd-Frank, federally insured depository institutions (IDIs) 
that participated in swaps transactions were required to “push out” certain 
types of swaps to an uninsured or “uncovered” affiliate capitalized 
separately from the IDI.11  Despite the ostensibly broad scope of the law, 
Dodd-Frank’s prohibition on federal assistance to IDIs was limited in effect 
                                                                                                                                             
However, a “swap” was initially defined in Section 721(47)(a)(i)-(iii) of Dodd-Frank and 
can be generally described as a transaction involving the exercise of an option, such as a 
put or call, or any type of “purchase, sale [or] payment that is dependent on the 
occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or 
contingency…” 7 U.S.C. § 1a (2010). Swaps have also been defined as “an agreement 
between two parties to exchange one or more cash flows measured by different rates or 
prices with payments calculated by reference to a principal base.” Mark D. Young et al., 
Large Trader Reporting Rules for Physical Commodity Swaps: An Overview of the New 
Obligations, 31 No. 10 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1,1 (2011). 
7 7 U.S.C. § 1a (2010). 
8 Id. 
9  Victoria McGrane, Swap Talk: Why Are People Fighting Over Dodd Frank and 
Derivatives?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/12/10/ 
swap-talk-why-are-people-fighting-over-dodd-frank-and-derivatives/ (“The provision is 
the work of former Democratic Sen. Blanche Lincoln of Arkansas.”). 
10 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2010) (defining “federal assistance” as the “use of any advances from 
any Federal Reserve credit facility or discount window that is not part of a program or 
facility with broad-based eligibility under . . . Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
insurance or guarantees. . . .”); Charles L. Hauch, Dodd-Frank's Swap Clearing 
Requirements and Systemic Risk, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 283 (2013) (“‘Federal 
assistance’ includes insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
and access to the Federal Reserve's discount window.”); 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2010) 
(defining a swaps entity as “any swap dealer, security-based swap dealer, major swap 
participant, major security-based swap participant, that is registered (i) under the 
Commodity Exchange Act; or (ii) the Securities Exchange act of 1934”).  
11 Hauch, supra note 10 (“As every commercial bank in the U.S. is obligated to have FDIC 
insurance, banks must either cease being a swaps dealer or spin off such activities into a 
separately capitalized affiliate.”); Rob Garver, Cromnibus Swaps Provision: Some Real 
Problems, Some Imaginary Ones, THE FISCAL TIMES (Dec. 14, 2011), 
www.thefiscaltimes.com/2014/12/14/CRomnibus-Swaps-Provision-Some-Real 
Problems-Some-Imaginary-Ones (“The Dodd-Frank Act, which reined in various 
dubious Wall Street practices in 2010, forced banks to ‘push out’ most swaps and 
derivatives trading activity to affiliates that are capitalized separately from the bank.”).  
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due to the law’s numerous carve-outs and exceptions.12  For example, the 
prohibition on federal assistance did not apply to major swap participants 
and major security-based swap participants that were IDIs.13  Dodd-Frank 
also permitted IDIs to participate in swaps that either (1) were executed for 
hedging or other risk mitigation activities, or (2) involved rates or reference 
assets that are permissible for investment by a national bank.14 In all, the 
exceptions and carve-outs to the swaps “push out” rule exempt around 
ninety to ninety-five percent of most financial institution’s activities.15 
To understand the importance of Dodd-Frank’s swaps “push-out” 
provision in the field of derivative finance, one must first understand the 
thinking behind it.  Certain types of swaps transactions have the potential to 
cause a chain reaction of bank failures, due to the systematic counterparty 
risks associated with derivative transactions.16  A common example of this 
systematic risk can be observed by analyzing credit default swaps. A credit 
default swap is a common swap transaction where one party, the protection 
seller, accepts periodic payments from another party, the protection buyer, 
in exchange for the protection seller’s assumption of the default risk of one 
or more underlying transactions, such as an institution’s purchase of a 
bundle of mortgage securities from a bank.17  
                                                             
12 Robert S. Bloink, Does the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act Rein in Credit Default 
Swaps? An EU Comparative Analysis, 89 NEB. L. REV. 587, 611 (2011) (explaining that 
“exceptions to the general prohibition threaten to swallow the rule”). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 8305(b)(2)(B) (2010); id. (“Major swap participants and major security-based 
swap participants that are insured depository institutions are excluded from the 
prohibition on federal assistance.”); Joel Zoch, Regulation of Swap Markets Under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 102, 108 (2010) (“Exceptions are made for 
major swap participants that are insured depository institutions, as well as swaps entities 
that limit their swap activities to hedging and other specially permitted activities.”). A 
“major swap participant” is defined at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(33)(a). A “major security-based 
swap participant” has the meaning given the term in section 3(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(32) (2010). 
14 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2010) (“The prohibition in subsection (a) shall apply to any insured 
depository institution unless the insured depository institution limits its swap or security-
based swap activities to: (1) Hedging and other similar risk mitigating activities directly 
related to the insured depository institution's activities. (2) Acting as a swaps entity for 
swaps or security-based swaps involving rates or reference assets that are permissible for 
investment by a national bank under the paragraph designated as “Seventh.” of section 
24 of Title 12, other than as described in paragraph (3).”). 
15 Scott Patterson, What’s at Stake in Swaps Market as Congress Tussles Over Dodd-Frank, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/12/11/whats-at-
stake-in-swaps-market-as-congress-tussles-over-dodd-frank/(explaining “the brouhaha 
over the swaps push-out rule involves roughly 5% to 10% of banks’ activities”). 
16 Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 675 (2010) (stating “a chain reaction of bank failures can 
occur as a result of counterparty risk on derivative transactions, such as credit default 
swaps (CDSs).”). 
17 David Mengle, Credit Derivatives: An Overview, 92 ECON. REV., No. 4, at 1-2 (“One 
party, the protection buyer, pays a periodic fee to the other party, the protection seller, 
during the term of the CDS. If the reference entity defaults or declares bankruptcy or 
2015] LAY  
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In this type of transaction, there is a great deal of counterparty risk, 
as it is possible that the protection buyer, protection seller, or the underlying 
parties to the transaction could become insolvent or otherwise unable to 
meet their obligations.  This counterparty risk of default contributes to the 
systematic risk of the derivatives system because if one party fails to meet 
its obligations, its counterparty may also be forced to default due to lack of 
funds or illiquidity.18  Systematic risk has been defined as “the risk that the 
failure of one significant financial institution can cause or significantly 
contribute to the failure of other significant financial institutions as a result 
of their linkages to each other.”19 
The systematic risk that occurred from swaps transactions, such as 
credit default swaps and other asset-backed securities, was perhaps the 
“prime culprit” in the financial collapse of 2008 because the failure of 
institutions that had heavily invested in swaps caused a chain reaction of 
failures in other institutions.20  In the midst of the Great Recession, the 
American taxpayers were forced to “bail out” several financial institutions 
that had heavily invested in swaps and sustained massive losses.21  Facing 
widespread insolvency among major financial institutions, the federal 
government provided assistance to numerous institutions by injecting funds, 
providing loans, and administering other types of aid.22  
Dodd-Frank’s “push-out” provision, as described above, sought to 
end these government bailouts—and their associated costs to taxpayers—by 
keeping the government’s pockets out of the risky swaps and derivative 
finance business.23  Congress made it clear in Dodd-Frank that the federal 
government was no longer willing to subsidize financial institutions’ 
                                                                                                                                             
another credit event occurs, the protection seller is obligated to compensate the 
protection buyer for the loss by means of a specified settlement procedure.”); see also 
Zoch, supra note 13, at 103 (“For example, in a credit default swap (“CDS”), one party 
accepts periodic payments in exchange for assuming some or all of the risk of default on 
an underlying credit obligation.”). 
18  Id. at 103 (“Financial companies heavily invested in CDS transactions contribute to 
systemic risk, for if one party to a CDS cannot meet its obligations, its counterparty may 
then find itself unable to meet other financial obligations.”). This factor is particularly 
relevant, as liquidity becomes an issue; institutions may have abundant assets on paper 
but be unable to meet their obligations when a counterparty defaults due to the 
institution’s assets being tied up in long-term financial instruments. 
19 Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673 (2010). 
20 David Line Batty, Dodd-Frank’s Requirement of “Skin in the Game” for Asset-Backed 
Securities May Scalp Corporate Loan Liquidity, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 13, 44 (2011) 
(stating that asset-backed securities were arguably the “prime culprit” in causing the 
recession). 
21 Scott, supra note 19, at 675.  
22 Id. 
23  Zoch, supra note 13, at 108 (stating the Dodd Frank came about as a response by 
Congress to public outcry resulting from “the bailouts of Citigroup, Bank of America, 
and others. . . .”). 
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swaps-related losses, stating “[t]axpayers shall bear no losses from the 
exercise of any authority under [Title VII of Dodd-Frank].”24   
Predictably, many financial institutions immediately opposed the 
swaps “push-out” provision.25  Large financial institutions argued that the 
law would expose institutions to an unreasonable amount of liability by 
taking away their access to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
insurance, which in turn would raise costs for consumers.26  Smaller banks 
also opposed the law, arguing that the swaps “push-out” provision created 
an issue of vertical equity because many regional banks, unlike national 
banks, lacked existing affiliates that were uninsured by the FDIC with 
whom they could execute swaps. 27   Despite their opposition, financial 
institutions were unsuccessful in encouraging Congress to repeal or make 
substantive changes in the swaps “push-out” provision until 2014, when 
Dodd-Frank was amended by language inserted into the Act.28  
 
III.  THE YODER PROVISION AND THE CONSOLIDATED AND FURTHER 
CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 2015 
 
The Yoder provision broadly expanded the types of swaps 
transactions that could be executed by federally insured or backed 
institutions.29 Initially, the Yoder provision faced minimal opposition when 
it was first proposed and adopted as part of the Act.30  In fact, most of the 
language of the Yoder provision was not new, but rather recycled from a 
“standalone” bill containing essentially the same text that was introduced in 
2013, yet failed to pass.31  However, the provision soon faced opposition 
from powerful Senate democrats including Nancy Pelosi, Maxine Walters, 
                                                             
24 15 U.S.C. § 8305(i)(3) (2010). 
25 Victoria McGrane, Regional Banks Push Back Against Swaps ‘Push-Out’ Rule, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/regional-banks-push-back-against-swaps-
push-out-rule-1414677032 (stating that “[b]ig banks that engage in a lot of derivatives 
trading such as J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp. 
have long made their concern about the provision known” and “[t]he stakes are high for 
banks subject to the provision: Firms that don’t comply face the potential loss of access 
to federal deposit insurance and the Federal Reserve’s discount window”). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat 2130 (2014) (amending the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act). 
29 Id. 
30 Jonathan Weisman, A Window Into Washington in an Effort to Undo a Dodd-Frank Rule, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/15/in-push-out-
provision-example-of-how-congress-does-its-job/ (“[The Yoder provision] was adopted 
after a few minutes of low-key debate, without a recorded vote, really without much 
notice . . . .”). 
31  Id.; Jennifer Bendery, Kevin Yoder MIA After Tucking Wall Street Bailout Into 
Government Spending Bill, THE HUFFINGTON POST 1 (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/ 15/ kevin-yoder-wall-street-bailout_n_6329784.html. 
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and Elizabeth Warren.32  Despite this formidable resistance, the measure 
passed the House with bipartisan support, was inserted into Section 630 of 
the Act, and signed into law by President Obama on December 16, 2014.33 
The Yoder provision amended Dodd-Frank’s swaps “push-out” 
provision by striking out certain segments and inserting alternative 
language.34  Thus, perhaps the easiest way to observe the changes in the law 
is to review a blacklined copy of the provision.  The first substantive 
change in the swaps “push-out” provision was the inclusion of a new term, 
“covered depository institutions” (CDIs).  An entire section was added to 
precisely define CDIs: “(A) an insured depository institution, as that term is 
defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813); 
or (B) a United States uninsured branch or agency of a foreign bank.”35  
This section essentially clarified an ambiguity in the provision concerning 
whether IDI protection applied to uninsured United States branches and 
agencies of foreign banks: a commonly cited problem in the original law.36  
These uninsured agencies are now given CDI status.37  
Next, the Yoder provision inserted a provision into the swaps 
“push-out” rule that allows CDIs to participate in a larger variety of swaps 
transactions.38  The Act amended Dodd-Frank by including a section titled  
“Certain Structured Finance Swap Activities” that designates permissible 
swap activities for CDIs.39  Under the amended law, CDIs may act as swaps 
entities for structured finance swaps, so long as the structured finance 
swaps are executed for “hedging or risk management purposes” or meet 
certain credit quality and categorical classification requirements set by 
“prudential regulators.”40  The law also added language in a section titled 
“Non-Structured Finance Swap Activities,” which allows CDIs to act as a 
“swaps entity for swaps or security based swaps other than a structured 
                                                             
32 Id.; Weisman, supra note 30.  
33 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat 2130 (2014). 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
36  156 CONG. REC. S5903-S5904 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (Colloquy between Senator 
Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, and Senator Blanche 
Lincoln, Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee and sponsor of the Swaps 
Pushout Rule) (noting the ambiguity in the law). 
37 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat 2130 (2014). 
38 Id.; American Bankers Association, Swaps Push-Out Provision, ABA BACKGROUNDER, 1 
(2014) (“The amendment to the Swaps Push-Out Rule does not repeal Section 716; it 
narrows the scope of products that are required to be “pushed-out” of an FDIC-insured 
bank to certain swaps related to structured finance.”). 
39 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat 2130 (2014). 
40 Id.; Julian Hammar, New Law Limits the Swaps Pushout Requirement to Apply Only to 
Certain ABS Swaps, MORRISON & FOERSTER CLIENT ALERT (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2014/12/141222SwapsPushoutRequire
ments.pdf. 
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finance swap,” and eliminated a section that contained a limitation 
concerning credit default swaps. 41   These additions allow CDIs to 
participate in: (1) any swap for the purpose of hedging and risk mitigation, 
(2) non-structured finance swaps, and (3) certain structured finance swaps, 
provided the aforementioned requirements are satisfied. 42  These 
requirements are estimated to affect around five to ten percent of most CDIs 
activities.43 
The new amendments to Dodd-Frank’s swaps “push-out” rule 
essentially give CDIs more freedom to engage in swap transactions than the 
original IDIs were given because the original law limited IDIs’ swaps 
activity to a narrower range of transactions.44  It is notable that the Yoder 
provision did not change or alter the transition period, or time limit, given 
to CDIs for divesting swap activities to an outside affiliate. 45  
Understanding the implementation and application of the Act’s 
amendments to Dodd-Frank, one can analyze the effects of this legislation. 
 
IV.  THE YODER PROVISION SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASES TAXPAYER 
LIABILITY FOR LOSSES RESULTING FROM PRIVATE  
STRUCTURED FINANCE SWAPS 
 
It is undisputable that the Act brought about significant changes to 
the way the federal government regulates the swaps and derivatives trading 
activities of CDIs.  However, there is a considerable amount of dispute 
concerning whether the Act’s changes to Dodd-Frank are positive or 
negative.  As mentioned infra in Section III, the Yoder provision faced 
significant opposition in Congress from pro-regulation representatives, who 
were irritated that Congressman Yoder attempted to insert the Yoder 
                                                             
41 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat 2130 (2014). 
42 Id.; Julian Hammar, New Law Limits the Swaps Pushout Requirement to Apply Only to 
Certain ABS Swaps, MORRISON & FOERSTER CLIENT ALERT (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www. 
mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2014/12/141222SwapsPushoutRequirements.pdf; 
Patterson, supra note 15 (“The rule states that the prohibition ‘shall not apply’ to swap-
trading activities in which a firm is ‘acting as a swaps entity for swaps or security-based 
swaps other than a structured finance swap.’ In other words, any swaps that is not a 
structured finance swap is not covered by the push-out.”). 
43 Patterson, supra note 15  (explaining “the brouhaha over the swaps push-out rule involves 
roughly 5% to 10% of banks’ activities”). 
44  15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2010); Julian Hammar, New Law Limits the Swaps Pushout 
Requirement to Apply Only to Certain ABS Swaps, MORRISON & FOERSTER CLIENT 
ALERT (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2014/12/ 
141222 SwapsPushoutRequirements.pdf; Patterson, supra note 16 (“The rule states that 
the prohibition ‘shall not apply’ to swap-trading activities in which a firm is ‘acting as a 
swaps entity for swaps or security-based swaps other than a structured finance swap.’ In 
other words, any swaps that is not a structured finance swap is not covered by the push-
out.”).  
45 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 
Stat 2130 (2014). 
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provision into the appropriations bill needed to avert a costly government 
shutdown. 46   For the purpose of analysis, however, this Article is not 
concerned with how the Yoder provision came to be, but rather what the 
Act will do.  
Banks and proponents of the Yoder provision argue that the Act’s 
amendments to Dodd-Frank will result in reduced costs for consumers, 
greater financial security, and decreased risk in the financial system 
because fewer swaps will be pushed out to uncovered (less regulated) 
institutions.47 Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, is 
among those who question the utility of the swaps “push-out” provision, 
stating, “[i]t’s not evident why [the “push-out” provision] makes the 
company as a whole safer.  And what we do see is that it will likely 
increase costs of people who use the derivatives and make it more difficult 
for the bank to compete with foreign competitors.”48  
Supporters of the provision also argue that the law will not have the 
sweeping effect detractors fear because, due to the Dodd-Frank’s numerous 
carve-outs and exceptions, Dodd-Frank’s swaps “push-out” provision may 
only affect around ten percent of most financial institutions’ swaps 
activities. 49   In addition, Dodd-Frank complicates the regulation of 
derivatives trading by requiring, in enigmatic language, certain swaps to 
occur in one type of institution and other swaps to occur in another. 50 
Further complicating matters, Dodd-Frank would essentially require 
                                                             
46 Weisman, supra note 30; Victoria Finkle, Swaps 'Pushout' Repeal Survives House Vote, 
AMERICAN BANKER (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.american banker.com/news/law-
regulation/swaps-pushout-repeal-survives-house-vote-1071632-1.html. (explaining 
opposition to the bill and referring to the Act as “Cromnibus"). 
47 Patterson, supra note 15; McGrane, supra note 9 (“[Supporters] argue the provision would 
actually increase risks in the financial system by pushing this swaps activity into entities 
that are less-heavily regulated than banks and where regulators have less insight. Big 
banks, who have been working for years to kill or scale back the provision, say the rule 
would result in higher costs to corporations to hedge everyday business risks, like the 
cost of jet fuel or interest rate changes.”). 
48  McGrane, supra note 9 (“Former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke was among those 
who questioned its efficacy: “It’s not evident why that makes the company as a whole 
safer. And what we do see is that it will likely increase costs of people who use the 
derivatives and make it more difficult for the bank to compete with foreign competitors,” 
he said in 2013.”). 
49 Scott Patterson, What’s at Stake in Swaps Market as Congress Tussles Over Dodd-Frank, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/12/11/whats-at-
stake-in-swaps-market-as-congress-tussles-over-dodd-frank/ (“Swaps tied to interest 
rates, foreign exchange, precious metals such as gold and silver and credit default swaps 
that are centrally cleared, a process regulators consider safer since clearinghouses takes 
on the risk of a default, are given a pass by the push-out requirement. Such contracts 
cover about 90% to 95% of banks’ swaps businesses, according to market experts and 
regulatory officials.”). 
50 Id. (“Supporters of the swaps-push-out repeal argue that the rule made little sense in the 
first place and needlessly complicated the market by segmenting swaps trading into 
separate parts of the bank.”). 
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institutions to review each swap to ascertain whether the institution was 
legally permitted to execute the transaction without pushing it out to a 
separate affiliate. This raises costs for the institution—which are passed on 
to the consumer—and jeopardizes time-sensitive deals. 
In response, opponents of the Yoder provision allege that the Act’s 
amendments to Dodd-Frank will subject taxpayers to significant fiscal 
liability, representing yet another illustration of “big business” asserting its 
interests in Washington.51  Senator Elizabeth Warren argued that the Yoder 
provision “would let derivatives traders on Wall Street gamble with 
taxpayer money — and, when it all blows up, require the government to 
bail them out.” 52   Representative Maxine Waters also condemned the 
provision, stating that “[u]nregulated trading in risky derivatives, especially 
those tied to subprime loans, was a leading cause of the financial crisis, 
which resulted in the taxpayer-funded bailouts of the banks and the worst 
economy since the Great Depression.”53  Opponents also argue that the 
Yoder provision could be the first skirmish in an ongoing attempt by 
financial institutions to repeal Dodd-Frank in its entirety.54  
Both arguments have their merits. It is clear that the swaps “push 
out” rule increases costs for consumers by increasing compliance and 
transactions costs for the institutions. Dodd-Frank also creates competition 
issues because smaller banks will have more difficulty competing with 
larger financial institutions, and larger financial institutions will have more 
difficulty competing against foreign, less regulated competitors. On the 
other hand, it is also true that allowing institutions to execute risky swaps 
transactions in federally insured units could lead to the resurgence of Great 
Recession-era taxpayer bailouts. The Act’s amendments to Dodd-Frank 
subject taxpayers to trillions of dollars of financial liability. 
After evaluating both arguments, it is clear that the Yoder provision 
will produce one tangible result: federally insured banks will now be 
allowed to participate in a greater variety of swaps.  These transactions, as 
discussed, supra, in Section II, can be very risky and have the potential to 
bring about financial crises as we observed in 2008.55  Furthermore, the 
                                                             
51 Finkle, supra note 46 (“This probably does represent a situation of where we are going 
from 'Dodd-Frank is sacrosanct' to ‘Dodd-Frank is an amendable piece of legislation,’ 
said Edward Mills, an analyst at FBR Capital Markets.”). 
52 Id. 
53 McGrane, supra note 9 (“Unregulated trading in risky derivatives, especially those tied to 
subprime loans, was a leading cause of the financial crisis, which resulted in the 
taxpayer-funded bailouts of the banks and the worst economy since the Great 
Depression,” said Rep. Maxine Waters, the top Democrat on the House Financial 
Services panel.”). 
54 Id. 
55 David Line Batty, Dodd-Frank’s Requirement of “Skin in the Game” for Asset-Backed 
Securities May Scalp Corporate Loan Liquidity, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 13, 44 (2011) 
(stating that asset-backed securities were arguably the “prime culprit” in causing the 
recession). 
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Yoder provision is unquestionably exposing taxpayers to any losses 
associated with these investments by allowing more of these swap 
transactions to occur in CDIs, who, in turn, can fall back on government 
surety and insurance programs.  Therefore, the Yoder provision exposes 
taxpayers to liability so substantial that it outweighs any proffered 
justification for the current law because the swaps “push-out” theoretically 
affects seven to fourteen trillion dollars of swaps which the Act now allows 
to be executed in federally insured units. 56   In addition, despite the 
institutions complaints about the complexity of the law and the difficulty of 
conforming their systems to the swaps “push-out” rule, affected institutions 
were given years to make the transition.57  Therefore, institutions should 
have had plans in place to comply with the original law. 
Moving forward, regulators and policymakers should consider the 
issue of taxpayer liability while drafting swaps-related regulations and 
legislation.  With tougher regulation and rules relating to Dodd-Frank’s 
swaps “push-out” provision, it is possible that regulators could significantly 
reduce the fiscal liabilities of taxpayers, yet also allow CDIs to engage in a 
broader range of swaps transactions. Regulators, rather than legislators, 
now shoulder the responsibility of deciding how to best balance the 
competing economic interests of financial institutions and taxpayers, short 
of Dodd-Frank’s repeal or further amendment. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
By amending Dodd-Frank’s swaps “push-out” rule, the Yoder 
provision allows CDIs to engage in a greater variety of swap transactions.  
Although it represents a victory for financial institutions, the Yoder 
provision exposes taxpayers to unjustifiable fiscal liability and risks the 
reoccurrence of Great Recession-era government bailouts.  Regulators and 
legislators should evaluate and, if necessary, repeal, amend, or limit the 
Yoder provision, and thus limit taxpayer liability for losses relating to the 
swap activities of CDIs.  
 
 
 
                                                             
56 Patterson, supra note 15 (“As of the second quarter, U.S. commercial banks held $146.5 
trillion worth of swaps, according to Tabb Group. That means, in theory, about $7 
trillion to $14 trillion in historical swaps deals could have been covered by the push-out 
rule.”). 
57 15 U.S.C. § 8305(f) and (h) (2010) (explaining that the law will take effect in two years 
following its package and laying out the law’s applicable transition period). 
